In the history of Roman-Parthian relations, one outstanding development occurred when king Phraates IV sent some of his sons and their next of kin to Rome ca. 10 BCE, officially to protect them from succession struggles that plagued the Parthian court (Strabo 16.1.28 [748]; cf. Res gestae 32.2; Iust. 42.5.12). This unexpected event came soon after a period of constant tensions between Rome and Parthia. Augustus celebrated the arrival of the Parthian royal relatives as his personal accomplishment in diplomacy. Almost all Roman authors describing this event saw the sons of Phraates IV as Augustus' hostages (cf. Vell. Pater. 2.94.4; Suet., Aug. 21.3), following the imperial propaganda in portraying their coming as an indubitable sign of Parthia's submission to Rome.

This exceptional situation became the subject of Jake Nabel's doctoral dissertation and subsequent (and recently published) monograph. The author presents his research questions and methods in the Introduction (1-14), arguing that the sons of Phraates IV, who played a pivotal role in the relations between the two empires, could be interpreted as more than Rome's subservient hostages, which is how they are perceived by the majority of scholars who adopt the Romanocentric perspective. According to Nabel, the Parthians might have adopted an opposite view and believed that sending Phraates' sons to Rome testified to Parthia's superiority over Rome. Near Eastern (and Iranian) rulers practiced the custom of foster-fatherhood: rulers placed their sons in the care of other rulers to foster mutual bonds between ruling dynasties, with the arriving children treated as part of their foster family. The Romans, Nabel argues, misinterpreted Phraates' gesture, which resulted in a "pragmatic misunderstanding" (3).

In the first chapter (Submission I: The Fosterage Background, 15-48), the author discusses the practice of fosterage as practiced by Near Eastern rulers in terms of establishing kinship between dynasties. Crucially, the stronger ruler would entrust his sons to the weaker party to impress his political advantage. Nabel's thorough examination of the cultural context of this practice corroborates his claim that it most likely motivated Phraates IV's decision. The Romans, unfamiliar with this custom, saw the sons as hostages, whereas the king believed that Augustus' court would be their nursery, and that the princeps himself would be their relative (47-48).

The second chapter (Submission II: Parthian Pragmatism, 49-81) considers fosterage from the Parthian perspective. Nabel begins by scrutinizing the role of political hostages in the Iranian world, one very dissimilar to its Roman equivalent. Phraates IV most likely did not intend to have his sons held as hostages in Rome, although he must have realized that each side would interpret the gesture as it saw fit to further its aims in domestic politics (57). The author pinpoints the circumstances in which Near Eastern rulers employed the practice of fosterage in their propaganda. Its greatest value lay in preserving dynastic continuity, with fosterage bonds most often given weight when several sons from different marriages fought over their father's throne. Fosterage also broadcasted the superiority of the party that sent its descendants abroad and built kinships between royal homes. Phraates IV, thinking of Parthia's internal matters, saw fosterage as a utilitarian gesture and disregarded its significance to the Romans (80-81).

The third chapter (Reception: The Arsacids at Rome, 82-121) discusses the Roman attitude towards the Arsacid royal relatives living in Rome, either under Augustus or under other emperors of the Julio-Claudian dynasty. The Roman emperors (mostly Augustus, but also others) undoubtedly exploited their presence, displaying them at their side during official state celebrations to broadcast Rome's superiority over Parthia. This policy certainly mismatched Phraates IV's intentions for his sons, leading to the situation defined by Nabel as a pragmatic misunderstanding.

The following chapter (Remission: The Emperor as Parthian Aristocrat, 122-154) examines the circumstances in which the sons and descendants of Phraates IV returned to Parthia and considers the Parthian political factions that repeatedly applied to Roman emperors for a pretender to the throne of the race of Phraates. Nabel tries to demonstrate that the Parthian aristocrats applying to Rome for new kings saw the Roman emperors not as foes but as fellow fosterers, bound in ties of dynastic friendship; nevertheless, Tacitus' account proves that the Romans exploited these Parthian pleas to intervene in Parthia's domestic affairs.

In the final chapter (Return: The Parthian Kingships of the Arsacids of Rome, 155-186), Nabel discusses unsuccessful attempts by the Arsacids of Rome to regain the Parthian throne. Roman sources explained their failure through the cultural dissonance: the Roman-raised Arsacids reportedly did not share customs and beliefs of their Parthian subjects and so lost their support. Nabel recasts this interpretation as nothing more than a literary topos: those descendants of Phraates IV who managed to seize the throne integrated well enough to strike coins very similar to those issued by their forebears. The monograph ends with a short Conclusion (187-194).

Jake Nabel sets out to explore a specific aspect of Phraates IV's decision to send his sons to Rome, viewed from a Parthian perspective. This decision had a clear and lasting influence on Romano-Parthian relations throughout the Julio-Claudian period, yet this angle has been largely overlooked in previous scholarship. Nabel introduces a fresh element to the discussion with the concept of a pragmatic misunderstanding - a mutually advantageous arrangement that benefited both sides. Although this interpretation sheds light on a previously neglected dimension of Romano-Parthian interactions, it does not fundamentally alter our understanding of Rome's broader policy toward Parthia under the Julio-Claudians. The presence of the Arsacid claimants in Rome provided the emperors with a means to influence Parthia's internal affairs without resorting to military force. [1] Nabel's work is deeply insightful and well worth the attention of anyone interested in the history of Romano-Parthian relations, diplomatic practices in the Iranian world, or interstate dynamics in the ancient Near East.

Note:

[1] See E. Dąbrowa: Les héros de luttes politiques dans l'État parthe dans la première moitié du Ier siècle de notre ère, in: Iranica Antiqua 24 (1989), 311-332; id.: '... ostentasse Romana arma satis ...'. The military factor in Roman-Parthian relations under Augustus and Tiberius, in: Limes XVIII. Proceedings of the XVIIIth International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies held in Amman, Jordan (September 2000), vol. 1, edited by Ph. Freeman et al., Oxford 2002, 275-279.

Edward Dąbrowa