As stated in the Introduction (1-10), the volume aims to offer "the most complete picture of all aspects of Crantor's philosophy" (1). Building on the workshop Crantor of Soli: Preliminary Questions to be Settled for a Reassessment of the Sources on His Thought and Place in the Old Academy (Milan, 2020) and combining revised and new contributions, the Companion largely fulfills this ambition. Despite the scant, fragmentary, and often ambiguous nature of the evidence, it succeeds in reconstructing a multifaceted intellectual profile of Crantor (ca. 335-275 BCE), restoring him as an original philosopher, the initiator of philosophical consolatio, and a subtle interpreter - and πρῶτος ἐξηγητής - of Plato, while foregrounding his "liminal" position between the Old Academy and later Platonism.

This reconstruction, developed across eight chapters and supported by an Index locorum and a general index of ancient authors and subjects (273-285), also engages with newly edited material, notably through K. J. Fleischer's discussion in Ch. 2 (37-53) of the Crantor passage from his recently published edition of Philodemus' History of the Academy (PHerc. 1021, cols. 16 and S = Crant. T 1b Mette). The improved readings clarify Crantor's vita and suggest that Philodemus' account - when compared with that of Diogenes Laertius (4.24-27 = Crant. T 1a Mette) - is fuller, more reliable, and closer to the wording of Antigonus of Carystus.

The volume's overall picture is further anchored in a historical reconstruction of Crantor as a central presence within the Academy, despite his never having served as scholarch. This perspective is articulated most clearly in Ch. 1 (11-36), where A. Beghini re-examines Crantor's role within Plato's school and revisits - on the basis of D.L. 4.24-25 and new evidence - the hypothesis of a "diplomatic" rupture with Polemo. Following a disagreement on ethical matters, Crantor is said to have withdrawn to the Asclepieion with some of his pupils, before persuading Polemo to temper his rigorism by abandoning the (Stoic) doctrine of ἀπάθεια, criticized in the Περὶ πένθους as harmful to both body and soul (Crant. F 3a-b Mette).

Beghini's hypothesis - that Crantor's withdrawal (εἰς τὸ Ἀσκληπιεῖον ἀνεχώρησε) presupposes doctrinal dissent - may be further supported by an analogous gesture attributed by Diogenes Laertius to Heraclitus, who, after refusing to legislate for the Ephesians, withdrew to the sanctuary of Artemis (ἀναχωρήσας δ' εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος, D.L. 9.2-3 = 22 A 1 DK), citing the city's corruption as grounds for institutional disengagement.

According to Beghini, Crantor's view of the passions as natural and integral to human life rests on a recognition of the "precariousness and frailty of the human condition" (29), inevitably exposed to suffering (cf. Crant. F 4 Mette). This ethical outlook is mirrored, he suggests, in the epistemological stance later adopted by Arcesilaus: his obscuritas rerum (Cic. Varro 44 = Arcesil. F 45 Vezzoli) may be understood as an epistemological transposition of Crantor's notion of "inscrutable fortune" (ἡ ἄδηλος [...] τύχη). On this reading, Crantor emerges as a significant philosophical source for Arcesilaus.

A related claim concerning Crantor's formative influence on Arcesilaus is advanced by H. Tarrant in Ch. 6 (119-129). In the context of his defence of Crantor's authorship of Alcibiades II, Tarrant argues that Crantor's epistemological interests already anticipate developments later associated with Academic "scepticism". Texts attributed to Crantor occasionally employ terminology later central to Arcesilaus - such as ἐποχή or τὸ εὔλογον - albeit "in a more measured and less technical manner" (125; cf. Plut. Procr. An. 1020D = Crant. F 11a Mette), a usage also attested in Alcibiades II.

Beyond its possible influence on Arcesilaus, Crantor's ethical stance also provided a distinctive model for the Hellenistic tradition of consolatory writing. His treatment of suffering and grief in the Περὶ πένθους, together with his rejection of the immanitas (Cic. Tusc. 3.6.12 = Crant. F 3b Mette) associated with early Stoic ἀπάθεια, is central to Ch. 4 (77-95), where P. De Simone focuses on Crantor's notion of μετριοπάθεια, according to which emotions admit of a natural measure compatible with wisdom.

Crantor's ethical proposal is further examined in Ch. 5 (96-118), where Ch. Vassallo reconstructs, on the basis of Sextus Empiricus' account of the prosopopeia on the goods (M 11.51-59 = Crant. F 7a Mette), the Platonic-Academic background of Crantor's conception of the summum bonum and the "emendations" he introduced to Polemo's ethical rigorism. Unlike Beghini, Vassallo interprets testimonies mitigating Polemo's stance (e.g. Fin. 4.18.51 = fr. 130 Gigante) not as evidence of a genuine revision, but as more plausibly reflecting Antiochus of Ascalon's "syncretistic" attempt to impose unity on the Old Academy's theory of the telos (109-111). He also refrains, unlike other contributors, from attributing an anti-Stoic intention to Crantor's ethical position (111-116). A more explicit internal dialogue might have better articulated these divergences.

The remaining chapters (3, 7, and 8) address Crantor as an exegete of Plato. Ch. 3 (54-76), by H. Tarrant and D. Baltzly, clarifies Proclus' designation of Crantor as ὁ πρῶτος τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγητής (Procl. In Tim. I 76.1-2 Diehl = Crant. F 8 Mette), the first in a line of Plato's ἐξηγηταί later including Porphyry and Iamblichus. The label denotes both an engagement with Platonic passages - chiefly from the Timaeus, though possibly also the Phaedrus and the Theaetetus - for their own sake rather than as components of a personal philosophical system (as in Xenocrates) and a familiarity with the Platonic corpus as a whole rather than with a single dialogue.

The authors further question the connection between Crantor's activity as a Platonic commentator and the ὑπομνήματα attributed to him by Diogenes Laertius (4.24; contra Slaveva-Griffin, ch. 7, 134), which they plausibly interpret as materials for personal use or limited circulation (cf. Philod. Ind. Ac., PHerc. 1021, col. 18, ll. 34-35 Fleischer). They accordingly dissociate these from Crantor's "30,000 lines," linked by Philodemus to his φιλοπονία (PHerc. 1021, col. 16.9-14 Fleischer) but more convincingly explained as poetic compositions. If so, one may further suggest that not only Diogenes' reference to ὑπομνήματα in 4.24 (as the authors themselves argue, 63), but also the attribution of some of the 30,000 lines to Arcesilaus is misplaced - both in Diogenes and in Philodemus - and reflects a confusion with the report in the vita of Arcesilaus (DL 4.32 = Crant. T 1a Mette, Arces. F 107 Vezzoli; Philod. Ind. Ac., PHerc. 1021, col. 18, ll. 34-40 Fleischer = Crant. 1b Mette, Arces. F 33 Vezzoli).

Crantor's adherence to Plato's text - stripped of the heavy metaphysical projects of Speusippus and Xenocrates and marking the emergence of philosophical commentary as a distinct practice of clarifying Plato "with Plato" (173, 177) - lies at the core of S. Slaveva-Griffin's contribution in Ch. 7 (130-198). Disproportionately long in comparison with the rest of the volume, the chapter focuses on Crantor's interpretation of the composition of the world soul in Timaeus 35a 1-36b 5, reconstructed through two interpretative "models" attributed to him by Plutarch (Procr. An. = Crant. F 10 Mette), epistemological and mathematical. While rejecting any ontologization of numbers, Crantor's mathematical model - centred on the lambda-shaped structure of the soul - emerges as his most original and influential exegetical contribution.

Finally, Ch. 8 (199-220), again by Ch. Vassallo, examines Proclus' short but intricate account of Crantor's reading of Plato's Atlantis (Procl. In Tim. I 75.30-76.10, esp. 76 Diehl = Crant. F 8 Mette). The chapter is complemented by an appendix (221-272) assembling the sources relevant to the main stages of the Atlantis debate from Plato to Proclus, while a synthetic overview of this material (200-209) provides the background for Vassallo's analysis of Crantor's position. [1]

Despite the caution rightly emphasized throughout, the volume substantially advances our understanding not only of Crantor, but also of the early Hellenistic Academy and the emergence of the Platonic commentary tradition, opening promising new avenues for future research in the history of ancient philosophy, Greek and Latin literature, and ancient history.

Note:

[1] One brief observation may be added concerning Vassallo's interpretation of Proclus' testimonium. As Vassallo argues, the grammatical subject of φησί in 76.9 Diehl is Plato rather than Crantor, so that Plato himself invokes the testimony (μαρτυροῦσι) of the Egyptian prophets, said to have "these things inscribed on pillars that still survive" (ἐν στήλαις ταῖς ἔτι σωζομέναις). This reading may find confirmation in Tim. 24a 2-4, where the Egyptian priest urges Solon to compare the ancient laws of pre-diluvian Athens with those preserved among the Egyptians "now" (νῦν). The underlying assumption - also suggested by Aristotle (e.g. Metaph. ? 8, 1074b 10-14; Cael. I 3, 270b 19-20) - is that, despite periodic catastrophes, traces of earlier knowledge survive into the present (νῦν), allowing partial access to an otherwise inaccessible past (τότε); a comparable νῦν/τότε (nunc/tum) pattern recurs in Lucretius' reconstruction of human history (5.797-800; 940-942). On this reading, the ἔτι in Proclus' account mirrors the Timaeus' νῦν and thus refers to Solon's time; accordingly - and here diverging from Vassallo - Plato should be understood as reporting inscriptions seen by Solon in Egypt, rather than as implying personal autopsy. It is therefore plausible that among the laws Solon could have encountered in Egypt were those inscribed on stelae (ἐν στήλαις) and set up in temples, a well-attested practice (cf. the Cairo Juridical Stela from Karnak). The characterization of Egyptian records as "sacred writings" (ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς γράμμασιν, Tim. 23e 3) may thus help explain how Crantor - or Proclus - came to associate the Timaeus' "writings" with temple inscriptions.

Chiara Rover